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Whenever a particle meets its antiparticle counterpart, it ... liberat[es] energy and produc[es] a 
burst of gamma rays ... According to our best theories of particular behaviour, the vacuum is a 
seeting mass of virtual particles in tis own right, even when there are no real particles present ... 
The virtual particles are as real as the rest of quantum theory (Gribbin, 1991: 127, 201) 
Queer physics. 
The ‘anti- of ‘(Anti)Queer’ is a queer anti.  In particle physics, a domain of science which was 
for a long time peddled as ultimately knowable, rational and objective, the postmodern turn 
has made everything queer (or chaotic, as the scientific version of this turn is perhaps more 
commonly named).  This is a world where not only do two wrongs not make a right, but a 
negative and positive do not calmly cancel each other out to leave nothing, as mathematics 
might suggest.  When matter meets with anti-matter, the resulting explosion can produce not 
only energy - heat and light? - but new matter.  We live in a world whose very basics are no 
longer the electron and the positron, but an ever proliferating number of chaotic, 
unpredictable - queer? - subatomic particles.  Some are ‘charmed’, others merely ‘strange’ .  
Weird science indeed. 
The ‘Anti-’ of ‘Anti-queer’ does not place itself neatly into binaries.  This is not a refutation 
of all that queer has been or will be.  It is explicitly a confrontation, a challenge, an attempt to 
take seriously not only the claims made for queer but the potent contradictions and silences 
which stand proudly when any attempt is made to write a history of the term.   
Specifically, ‘Anti-Queer’ is not Beyond Queer, the title of Bruce Bawer’s 1996 book which 
calmly and self-confidently explains the failings of queer, extols a return to a liberal political 
theory of cultural change and places its own marker on queer as a movement whose purpose 
has been served.  We are not Beyond Queer.  And if we are Anti-Queer, it is only to challenge 
those working in the arena to acknowledge and work with some of the facts of the 
movement’s history whose productivity has been erased with a gesture which has, proved, 
bizarrely, to be reductive and homogenising. 
This Introduction was heading in the direction of gentle and superior chastisement, a sort of 
uncover Beyond Queer.  The piece was readied and on the launch platform before its 
structural flaws became suddenly apparent.  It was to be called ‘La Politiques des Queers’, 
and its argument was to be a simple one: that Queer theory was not, and never had been a 
‘theory’, per se.  The argument would have taken off from the ‘Politiques des auteurs’ which 
has informed film theory at various times since the nineteen sixties.  Translated with a lively 
abandon as ‘Auteur theory’, by Peter Wollen, this attempt to promote interpretation of filmic 
texts through the figure of the director was popular in academic criticism for a decade; and 
yet, as John Caughie notes: 
Auteurism was not in itself a theory.  Cahiers [du Cinema, the French film magazine 
where a politiques des auteurs first emerged] proposed it as a policy; [Andrew] Sarris 
was prepared to admit it was more of an attitude than a theory; and Movie refused 
theoretical elaboration (Caughie, 1981: 13). 
Indeed:  
when what Henderson calls the ‘scandal’ of its lack of theoretical foundation was 
recognized ... the ‘auteur-structuralists’ themselves came to acknolwedge that their 
relationship to structuralism had been less theoretical than instrumental (124) 
This would have been the trajectory of the Introduction to ‘Anti-Queer’; a challenge to the 
‘scandal’ of Queer Theory’s lack of theory. 
Of course, such a challenge would have been fundamentally misconcieved, relying on a 
profoundly unQueer understanding of what ‘theory’ might be; hanging on to some of the (pre-
chaotic) scientific mystique of a term whose authority calls across the gap of linguistic 
uncertainty to good old fashioned empiricism.  If theory is understood in a Queer sense, 
objections disappear: 
.Theory is ... a very special kind of story ... A theory is a story with a plot whose ending 
is satisfactory explanation, whose main characters struggle heroically with obscurity for 
the length of a hard journey through the territory of difficulty and darkness, until the 
forest clears and they emerge into the upland spaces of light and clarity (Inglis, 1993: 
245) 
If theory is no longer the privileged, scientific space of provable fact, if theories are 
understood to be potent and political narratives (fictions, in Hartley’s term), it makes little 
sense to berate Queer for its use of the term, to insist that it be renamed a ‘policy’ or (even 
better) an ‘attitude’ (REFERENCE TO GLQ).  The term ‘undertheorised’ (QUOTATION 
APPLIED TO AUTEUR THEORY) becomes a charge which says more about those taking it 
upon themselves to pass judgement than it does about the field of knowledge thus described. 
And yet ... 
And yet, something remains of the unease which provided the initial motivation for this issue 
of Social Semiotics.  That unease is a response to that tendency in Queer which refuses self-
reflexivity; in particular, the notion that Queer is whatever anyone who wishes to use the term 
desires to make of it.  The recognition that queer theory has ‘neither a fundamental logic nor a 
consistent set of characteristics’ (Jagpes, 1996: 96) has lead too many authors to a position 
whereby Queer becomes ‘intuitive’ (Michael Warner, quoted in Jagose, 1996: 96).  As I have 
argued elsewhere, such an extension of Queer’s contradictory nature is neither desirable nor 
inescapable (McKee, forthcoming).  For the fact of Queer’s lack of fundamental logic and 
consistent set of characteristics does not mean that Queer Theory has no history. 
The implications of refusing to define queer have been profound.  Epistimologically, queer 
becomes a heuristic project.  If its knowledge cannot be communicated in terms of argument, 
example, repetition, if it is purely ‘intuitive’, then there is no basis from outside queer’s 
institutional bases (it doesn’t have them? shame on you.  Consider the journals, the books, 
publishing houses, conferences, panels ...) from which to engage with queer. If it is 
unknowable, then argument can finally pass no further than assertion.  This is an ecclesiastical 
knowledge, acquired by revelation, transmitted by benediction - FIND QUOTE FROM 
BRIAN ON THE DESIRE FOR DISCIPLES, AND THE REFERENCES HE GAVE ME 
WHICH I’VE LOST. 
.This is the tendency referred to above as homogenising.  For Queer, whatever its openness 
and claims to lack of centre, has been taken up and circulated historically in various ways.  To 
return all of these to being the equal of status of Queer is ahistorical.  By contrast, to write a 
history of these uses is not to be unQueer.  To try to name the real Queer, to police the uses of 
the word, is a different project, and one whose merits I am uninterested in debating.  But that 
is not the project of this collection. 
INTRODUCE THE ARTICLES. 
The same - perhaps slightly eccentric - logic orders the book reviews in this issue.  All of the 
books reviewed proclaim themselves to be ‘Queer’; and it will become obvious that each has 
a particular version of ‘Queer’ in mind.  The point of this collection is not to produce a canon, 
to review those books which essentially define queer and which may be read to give an 
insight into the central project of Queer.  It is rather to suggest some of the multititude of 
ways in which Queer has been taken up and circulated, the varieties of - often contradictory - 
meanings which it has (quite successfully) borne 
Queer has not exhausted its usefulness.  Queer has only begun to realise its potential.  The 
Call for Papers for this issue of Social Semiotics went out under the title ‘Anti-Queer’.  
Ignoring the body of the text, a flurry of abstracts seized on the title as an invitation to attack 
the project of Queer. The conviction with which Queer has been - and continues to be - 
attacked, stands testament to the importance of the issues it addresses - identity, politics, 
sexuality.  Hopefully, the revised formulation (Anti)Queer (for which I am indebted to Mark 
Gibson) clarifies the studied ambivalence of this volume.  Queer is a stimulating, a 
provocative and a useful project.  It is also a problematic one.  This issue of Social Semiotics 
addresses some of those problmes - not as insurmountable difficulties which Queer must 
resolve or stand forever paralysed - but as some of the sites whose tension has proved most 
productive of the very energy of Queer. 
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